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1. ORIGINS 
 
It is now commonly conceded that the origins of modern systems of intellectual 
property protection lie in the fifteenth century Venetian system of printing privileges,1 
which was subsequently adopted with local variations in a range of other European 
countries.2  The Venetian system, which was designed to stimulate foreign trade 
rather than to engage in aesthetic debates about forms of creative output, was not 
concerned with distinctions between written works and images.3  If a work was 
reproducible through the new(ish) technique of printing then it was an eligible 
candidate for a privilege.  There was, however, a clear distinction between works of 
visual art considered reproducible by print and other works of visual art.  As Stapleton 
points out, in Renaissance Venice this distinction hinged around portability.4  Prints 
were, of course, not only reproducible but also portable whereas paintings, frescoes 
and sculptures were considered to be specific to particular locations.  The methods by 
which these forms of visual art generated income for those involved in their 
production also differed.  Whereas income was generated off prints by sale after 
production, location-specific works were generally made subject to commission prior 
to production.  Thus, the economic effects of copying were quite distinct.  Under 
these circumstances, it is not surprising that the forms of regulation governing 
production were different: visual art in the form of paintings, frescos and sculptures 
remained under the control of the guilds, while printed works of visual art became 
subject to the same general form of regulation as printed words. 
 
Success in obtaining a printing privilege seems to have depended on the abilities of 
the petitioner to both flatter and convince the Venetian authorities.  They were a hard-
headed lot and there is little evidence that flattery alone could get a petitioner 
everywhere, rather considerations of local market stability and foreign trade value 
were paramount.5  In this sense, the origins of the intellectual property system lie in 
market regulation and not in a particular aesthetic theory.  Nevertheless, there is some 
                                                 
1 See J Stapleton, Art, Intellectual Property & the Knowledge Economy (Doctoral Thesis, Goldsmiths 
College, University of London, 2002), http://www.jaimestapleton.info/download.htm, ch 2, Grateful 
acknowledgment is made of the influence of this work, & of discussions with its author, on a number 
of the ideas in this paper. 
2 See further E Armstrong, Before Copyright: The French Book Privilege System 1498-1526 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, republished 2002). 
3 See further D Landau & P Parshall, The Renaissance Print 1470-1550 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1994); & Stapleton, n 1 supra. 
4 Stapleton, n 1 supra. 
5 Stapleton, n 1 supra. 
evidence that in framing their arguments for privileges the petitioners came to reflect 
the predominant discourse or paradigm of creativity, which was based in theories of 
rhetoric.  The rhetorical paradigm of creativity, which continues to retain considerable 
purchase in some quarters, focussed upon the labour or creativity of the artist in 
gathering together and arranging “ideas” into a particular and distinctive end product.  
Between the Medieval and the Renaissance periods an important alteration had taken 
place in relation to the origins of the “ideas”, which resulted in an emphasis on the 
creator’s contribution to the ensuing artistic work: 
Medieval accounts of the production of art were based on a Christianised 
version of the Platonic theory of Ideas.  Within such a metaphysical 
cosmology, the inner “idea” from which an artist created an image was placed 
in his mind by the “divine intellect” … In contrast … Renaissance art theory 
was practically, rather than theologically, organised, placing its emphasis on 
the study of nature.  In such discourse, the inner “idea” from which the artist 
worked came to be regarded as the product of external sensory experience.  
The art theory that ran parallel to the Venetian privilege system then tended 
towards accounts of idea that stressed an individual’s labour rather than the 
innate quality of the idea from which they worked.6 
 
The famous spat between Dürer and Marcantonio Raimondi,7 which resulted in the 
former’s visit to Venice in 1506, is capable of being construed as an early conflict 
over authorship in the sense that its resolution turned on an agreement under which 
Marcantonio signed his copies of Dürer’s works with his own initials rather than 
Dürer’s monogram.  However, less ambiguous instances of the influence of rhetorical 
thought in the Venetian system were still a few years away.  The earliest overt 
example uncovered by Stapleton occurred in the petition for a privilege issued to 
Zuan da Brexa in 1514.  In this petition, da Brexa pleads that: 
Being that I am a scholar of my own virtue, I made one drawing, and that 
drawing I made cut in wood with my own name in which I consumed a lot of 
time and effort and expense so that it would be an excellent work … And as 
this aforementioned design is beautiful and worthy, it was immediately taken 
by others who started to want to print it, which would be against any right of 
justice and gravely to my damage, that I having suffered and made great effort 
for a long time in such a work, that others should without any effort gain from 
my own effort and sweat.8 
Paralleling the developments in the discourse of Renaissance art, by 1566 the “right of 
justice” to which da Brexa referred, was much more clearly articulated in a petition by 
Titian for a printing privilege.  Titian refers to the “great expense and effort” involved 
in his printed drawings and requests a fifteen year privilege “[s]o that men with little 
study of the art, to avoid effort and for lust of gain, might not damage the name of the 
first author of those prints by worsening them, and take advantage of the fruit of the 
effort  of others; also deceive the people with counterfeit prints of little value”.9 
                                                 
6 Stapleton, n 1 supra, 70-71, citing E Panofsky, Idea: A Concept in Art Theory (trans J J S Peake) 
(London: Harper & Row, 1968), 35-40 & 51; & U Eco, Art & Beauty in the Middle Ages (London: 
Yale University Press, 1986). 
7 See Stapleton, n 1 supra, 53-57.  See also L Pon, Raphael, Dürer & Marcantonio Raimondi: Copying 
& the Italian Renaissance Print (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). 
8 Stapleton, n 1 supra, 57-58. 
9 Stapleton, n 1 supra, 63, citing D Rosand & M Murano, Titian & the Venetian Woodcut (Washington 
DC: International Exhibitions Foundation, ex. Cat., 1976), ch 1, f 48. 
 
Despite the tortuous and twisting path from the Venetian system to the modern 
systems of copyright protection, this early history of the protection of the image 
resonates through modern copyright protection of works of visual art in a number of 
ways.  The result has been the evolution of a system of protection that is, at least, 
idiosyncratic.  In some respects this reflects the general uncertainty that pervades the 
relationship between copyright law and creativity.  Among the myriad consequences 
of this uncertainty, three stand out.  The first is that creativity is protected under 
copyright law only where its product falls within one of the categories of “copyright 
work”.  Secondly, tensions between creativity and copyright protection result from the 
way in which copyright must relate to the creative process both by protecting creative 
output and by allowing the use of that creative output for the purpose of creating other 
works.  Thirdly, it might be argued with some plausibility that copyright’s focus is the 
protection, not of primary creative works, but of derivative or entrepreneurial works.  
Thus, the authors of primary creative works, such as literary, dramatic, musical and 
artistic works, arguably derive less economic benefit from the copyright system than 
the “authors” of sound recordings, films, broadcasts and published editions.10  This is 
consistent with the proposition that a primary function of copyright law is 
communicative.11  Yet, it leaves the question of what copyright law might be 
attempting to achieve in relation to the primary creative works in something of a state 
of limbo. 
 
The relationship between copyright law and forms of creativity in the visual arts 
refracts these three systemic consequences through the glass of its distinctive history 
with some noticeably anomalous results.  Firstly, like other forms of creative output, 
works of visual art must fit somewhere within the definition of a copyright work.  
However, it is clear that the relevant law lacks any central concept of “visual art”.  In 
contrast to copyright’s definition of other forms of creative output, the types of works 
of visual art protected by copyright law comprise a list.  This list lumps together a 
variety of works, irrespective of critical differences, with some rather perplexing 
results.  At the same time, one major form of visual art is hived off from the list and 
subject to different copyright treatment.  To the extent that any concept holds the list 
of protected works together, however loosely, it is one derived from the rhetorical 
discourse of the Renaissance period.  In the hands of modern copyright law, this is 
reduced to a focus on the production of the discrete art object by a recognisable 
creator (or creators).  The growth in the twentieth century of forms of artistic practice 
based on the discourse of semiotics,12 which focus on the process rather than just the 
product, have posed a particular problem for the copyright definition of “artistic 
works”.  Secondly, not only do the effects of rhetorical discourse manifest themselves 
in relation to the definition of protected works they also have an effect on the way in 
which the copyright protection of works of visual art searches for a balance between 
protecting creativity and permitting its use in further creative works.  This balance 
                                                 
10 See R Towse, Creativity, Incentive and Reward: An Economic Analysis of Copyright and Culture in 
the Information Age (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2001), esp chs 6 & 8, in which it is argued that 
copyright generates little income for most creative artists.  Nevertheless, Towse suggests that copyright 
is valuable to creative artists for reasons of status and control of their work. 
11 For a discussion of this proposition, see W van Caenegem, “Copyright, Communication and New 
Technologies” (1995) 23 Federal Law Review 322; & N W Netanel, “Copyright and a Democratic 
Civil Society” (1996) 106 Yale Law Journal 283. 
12 See further Stapleton, n 1 supra, ch 3. 
seems particularly problematic in relation to works of visual art – not least because of 
the growth of artistic practices and traditions derived from semiotics that focus on this 
creative tension.  Thirdly, some works of visual art seem to raise different issues in 
copyright law because, unlike other primary creative works, their connection to 
particular forms of entrepreneurial copyright work is less clear.  This is a consequence 
of the distinction between material and immaterial works of visual art, that is, a 
consequence of reproducibility and portability.  Modern copyright law, which has 
stepped in to protect and regulate the production of those works of visual art no longer 
subject to the guild system or the system of patronage, contains no explicit 
recognition of this fundamental distinction.  Yet, the effects of the distinction, clearly 
understood by the Venetian system of privileges, echo through its operation. 
 
Underpinning all this, there is an atavistic tendency in copyright law to treat works of 
visual art with the same broad brush as it treats literary works, or to calibrate its 
treatment of works of visual art against its treatment of literary works.  Overall, it 
often appears that when the treatment of works of visual art is compared with the 
treatment of literary works, copyright law makes the simultaneous errors of treating 
the similar dissimilarly and the dissimilar similarly.  Of these two errors, however, 
that of treating the dissimilar similarly is more marked.  To demonstrate these points, 
this paper now turns to an examination of the current regime for copyright protection 
of works of visual art. 
 
 
2. DEFINING ARTISTIC WORKS 
 
The discussion in this paper of the meaning of “artistic works” for copyright purposes 
is based upon the definition provided in the United Kingdom Copyright Designs and 
Patents Act 1988.  This definition may be regarded as representative of approaches 
prevalent in common law jurisdictions13 and is not more generally atypical.  It is 
found in section 4, which provides as follows: 
(1) In this Part “artistic work” means –  
(a) a graphic work, photograph, sculpture or collage, irrespective of 
artistic quality, 
(b) a work of architecture being a building or a model for a building, 
or 
(c) a work of artistic craftsmanship. 
(2) In this Part –  
“building” includes any fixed structure, and a part of a building or fixed 
structure; 
“graphic work” includes –  
(a) any painting, drawing, diagram, map, chart or plan, and  
(b) any engraving, etching, lithograph, woodcut or similar work; 
“photograph” means a recording of light or other radiation on any medium on 
which an image is produced or from which an image may by any means be 
produced, and which is not part of a film; 
“sculpture” includes a cast or model made for the purposes of sculpture. 
 
                                                 
13 See, eg, the Australian Copyright Act 1968, s 10(1), in which the definition of “artistic work” is very 
similar. 
There are four interrelated aspects of this definition upon which this paper will focus.  
First, the fact that the creation of a list, even a rather ragbag list of this sort, 
immediately has an exclusionary effect.  Secondly, the paper will consider the 
problematic reference to “artistic quality”, which is said to be irrelevant to those 
things mentioned in subsection (1)(a), while no such limitation in made in relation to 
works of architecture or works of artistic craftsmanship.  This creates a contentious 
relationship between the copyright protection of artistic works and notions of “art” 
and “artistic quality”.  Thirdly, the paper will examine the peculiarity of putting all 
these different things together under the generic heading of “artistic works” and thus 
treating them as though they were in some way related or similar.  Conversely, the 
final part of this section contrasts the effect of treating the dissimilar similarly with 
that of distinguishing between the works of visual art falling within the definition of 
“artistic works” and those falling within the definition of “films”. 
 
 
(a) The Exclusionary Effect of the List 
 
Despite the wide appreciation of the fact that there are many different types of 
literary, dramatic and musical works, it is fairly standard for copyright statutes to give 
little explanation of the meaning of “literary”, “dramatic” and “musical”.14  Things 
are rather different in relation to the category of artistic works.  In the case of the UK 
copyright legislation, the list of artistic works now appearing in section 4 is the 
product of gradual accretion, beginning with the protection of engravings in 1735.15  
It appears that little regard has been given to the relationship of the listed items with 
each other, especially the extent to which the various things may overlap with each 
other.16 
 
More significantly, the creation of a list is by its nature exclusionary and constricts the 
flexibility of the law to adapt to new forms of artistic practice.  A good example of 
this occurred in the Oasis case.17  This case concerned the assemblage of various 
objects along with the members of the British band, Oasis, in a swimming pool.  The 
purpose of this assemblage was to create a photograph for the band’s upcoming album 
cover.  It was argued that the assemblage itself was an artistic work because it was a 
sculpture, a work of artistic craftsmanship, and/or a collage.  All three 
characterisations were rejected: sculpture because there was no element of carving or 
modelling; work of artistic craftsmanship because there was no element of 
craftsmanship; and collage because, surprisingly, there was no glue or adhesive 
involved. 
 
                                                 
14 See, eg, the UK Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 3(1). 
15 Engraving Copyright Act of 1734.  This was followed by the protection of calico designs in 1787; 
sculptures in 1798 (Sculpture Copyright Act of 1798 as amended in 1814); prints & lithographs in 1852 
(International Copyright Act of 1852); drawings, paintings and photographs in 1862 (Fine Art 
Copyright Act of 1862); works of artistic craftsmanship in 1911 (Copyright Act of 1911); & collages in 
1988 (Copyright Designs & Patents Act 1988): L Bently & B Sherman, Intellectual Property Law 
(Oxford: OUP, 2001), 62 & 62n; S Stokes, Art & Copyright (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001), 23-25. 
16 Eg, the extent of overlap between sculptures and works of artistic craftsmanship is problematic, 
especially since sculptures are protected “irrespective of artistic quality” while no such limitation 
applies to works of artistic craftsmanship. 
17 Creation Records Ltd v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1997] EMLR 445. 
As Stokes points out,18 a particularly interesting part of the judgment of Lloyd J was 
his consideration of the argument by counsel for the plaintiffs that section 4 ought not 
to be construed so as deny copyright protection to new forms of artistic works.  Lloyd 
J considered a range of contemporary art forms that appeared to raise problems of 
characterisation under section 4, including things such as Gilbert and George’s living 
sculptures, Rachel Whiteread’s house, and many forms of installation art.  In the end, 
he did not address the question of whether or not these were “artistic works” for 
copyright purposes.  He simply decided that the assemblage in the Oasis case was 
ephemeral and, therefore, to be distinguished from these other works.  This is a point 
to which this paper will return.  What we may, at least, take from this case is that the 
arrangement of found objects (objets trouvés) or ready-mades19 is outside copyright 
protection, unless perhaps they are permanently situated.  It may be that all ready 
mades, whether assembled or not, are simply outside copyright protection.20 
 
There are, of course, other explanations for cases like the Oasis case and ensuing 
doubts over the copyright status of works of visual art such as living sculptures, 
installation art and ready-mades.  One of these is that they have fallen foul of what 
might be called the product/process distinction, which grounds the rhetorical aesthetic 
tradition in which copyright is based.  The effects of this distinction, which focuses 
protection on the work or product, rather than the creative or artistic practice, are 
particularly noticeable in relation to works of visual art falling within the definition of 
“artistic works”.  Another explanation for cases like the Oasis Case is that they are as 
much a tribute to conservatism and the failure of judicial imagination as they are to 
the exclusionary effect of a list.  Whatever the explanation, however, they raise 
serious concerns about the relationship between copyright protection and new forms 
of artistic practice.  However, as we are about to see, the difficulty of both legislators 
and judges in dealing with the concept of “artistic works” is not limited merely to new 
forms of artistic practice. 
 
 
(b) The Significance of Artistic Quality 
 
To someone who is not a copyright aficionado, the notion that works are artistic 
works “irrespective of artistic quality” may be problematic – but this type of 
oxymoron is not atypical in copyright law.  As a consequence, those accustomed to 
the peculiarities of copyright law bravely face the concepts of the protected literary 
work with no literary merit and the protected artistic work with no artistic merit.  
What is alarming, however, about the definition of “artistic works” in s 4 is that only 
those types of artistic works referred to in paragraph (a) are protected irrespective of 
artistic quality, suggesting that artistic quality or merit may be relevant to works of 
architecture and works of artistic craftsmanship. 
 
                                                 
18 Stokes, n 15 supra, 35-36. 
19 According to Stokes, n 15 supra, 2n, citing Chilvers, A Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Art (OUP, 
1999), “’[r]eady-made’ is the name given by Marcel Duchamp to a type of work he created which 
consists of mass-produced article isolated fro its functional context and displayed as a work of art”. 
20 Stokes notes that this would exclude Marcel Duchamp’s bicycle wheel attached to a stool, which was 
exhibited in 1913 with a view to challenging ideas about the nature of art: n 15 supra, 124.  Cf Bently 
& Sherman, n 15 supra, 63. 
The struggles of the English courts with the notion of “works of artistic 
craftsmanship” are well known.21  What is very clear from these cases is that despite 
the absence of the expression “irrespective of artistic quality” in para (c), which 
suggests that artistic quality is relevant, the courts have declined to be drawn into the 
question of whether or not the work of artistic craftsmanship has artistic merit.  Rather 
they have considered issues such as the aim and impact of the craftsman/creator22 and 
the motivations of those wishing to acquire the work in question.23  Arguably what 
they are considering in these cases is whether or not the work has the quality or nature 
of an artistic work, not whether it has artistic quality or merit.  It is clearly the case, 
that judges have undertaken this same enquiry in relation to artistic works falling 
within paragraph (a).  That is, they have enquired whether or not the work has the 
quality or nature of an artistic work of the type in question.  Arguably, exactly this 
sort of consideration lay behind the decision of Laddie J in Metix (UK) Ltd v G H 
Maughan (Plastics) Ltd.24  In this case Laddie J held that a sculpture was “a three 
dimensional work made by an artist’s hand” and that, consequently, casts used for 
making double-barrelled cartridge syringes were not sculptures because they could 
not be regarded as the work of an artist.25  Another rather less overt example of the 
court enquiring into whether a work has the nature or quality of the type of artistic 
work in question occurred in the Adam Ant case.26  Faced with the argument that the 
make-up on Adam’s face was a graphic work in the form of a painting, Lawton LJ 
said a painting “is not an idea: it is an object” and as such it must be affixed to a 
surface.27  Thus suggesting the notion that one of the qualities of a painting, if not 
artistic works more generally, is permanent fixation.  There is no obvious reason why 
a painting or a work of art must be permanently affixed and it is argued below that the 
result of such a determination is to exclude particular types of visual art from the 
protection of copyright law.  Of course, the influence of rhetoric discourse is 
startlingly clear. 
 
 
(c) Treating the Dissimilar Similarly I: the permanence requirement 
 
In relation to the copyright definition of an “artistic work”, one of the primary 
manifestations of the phenomenon whereby the dissimilar is treated similarly is the 
requirement of permanent affixation derived from the Adam Ant case.  As discussed 
above, in this case Lawton LJ held that facial make-up was not a painting as it was not 
permanently affixed to a surface.  Even as a dictum on the definition of a painting for 
the purpose of the copyright definition of artistic works this is problematic enough in 
terms of the relationship between copyright law and artistic practice.  There has, 
however, been considerable confusion about how widely this troublesome dictum 
applies.  That is, does it apply just to paintings, just to graphic works, just to works 
falling within the first paragraph of the definition of artistic works, or to all artistic 
                                                 
21 See, eg, George Hensher Ltd v Restawile Upholstery (Lancs) Ltd [1975] RPC 31, Merlet v 
Mothercare plc [1986] RPC 115, Vermaat v Boncrest Ltd, The Times, 23 June 2000. 
22 See Hensher v Restawile, n 21 supra, per Lord Simon of Glaisdale; & Merlet v Mothercare, n 21 
supra. 
23 See Hensher v Restawile, n 21 supra, per Lord Reid & Lord Simon of Glaisdale. 
24 [1997] FSR 719. 
25 Cf Hi-Tech Autoparts Ltd v Towergate Two Limited [2002] FSR 15, in which the court refused to 
extend this reasoning to graphic works. 
26 Merchandising v Harpbond [1983] FSR 32. 
27 Ibid., 46. 
works?  It is clear that the more widely one applies this rule, the more limiting its 
effects become.  If it applies only to paintings or other graphic works, it might 
exclude, for example, impermanent chalk drawings.  If applied more widely, the 
concept of permanence might exclude from the definition of artistic works things like 
sand sculptures, ice sculptures and much installation art.  Despite this (or perhaps 
because of it), the general trend in judicial approaches in common law countries has 
been to read the requirement widely.  So, for example, in the Oasis case,28 one of the 
reasons why the collection of objet trouvés was held not to be a sculpture, collage or 
work of artistic craftsmanship was that it was not intended to remain permanently in 
its particular arrangement.  In the Australian case of Komesaroff v Mickle29 the 
requirement of permanence was extended to the category of works of artistic 
craftsmanship with the result that so-called sand pictures, the contents of which move 
and change appearance depending upon the angle at which the picture is placed, did 
not qualify as artistic works.  However, just to complicate the situation, 
contemporaneously with the Oasis case, the UK case of Metix v Maughan30 
questioned the requirement of permanence in relation to, at least, sculptures.  Laddie J 
noted that such a requirement would, for example, exclude ice sculptures. 
 
One might argue that the somewhat uncertain state of the law with respect to the 
application of the permanence requirement is the inevitable the result of taking a 
characteristic that may possibly apply to one form of artistic work and attempting to 
extend it through the whole diverse category of artistic works.  The discomfort of 
Laddie J in Metix with the idea that ice sculptures might be excluded from copyright 
protection may demonstrate a laudable awareness of the consequences of the over-
extension of the permanence requirement.  Generally, however, it is arguable that the 
more common discomfort that members of the judiciary feel in relation to the whole 
category of artistic works has resulted in the misapplication of an inappropriate but 
comprehensible rule.  The tendency to extend such a rule to such a range of different 
forms of artistic expression is clearly encouraged by the lumping together of widely 
diverse forms of artistic creativity under one generic heading of “artistic works”.  It is 
also likely that the rule is, again, a reflection of the apparent emphasis of copyright 
law on product/work rather than process/practice. 
 
 
(d) Treating the Similar as Distinct 
 
Outside the boundaries of copyright law, there seems to be little doubt that film forms 
part of the visual arts.  However, copyright law has always treated films separately 
from the “artistic works” considered above.  Separating film as a distinct category 
from other works of visual art made some sense when the usual assumption was that 
the producer of a film was the first holder of copyright.  This did not sit particularly 
uncomfortably with the idea that, as with sound recordings, typographical 
arrangements and broadcasts, copyright was protecting those who invested in 
communication or dissemination of the relevant creative works.  It also contrasted 
with the position in relation to “artistic works” (and literary, dramatic and musical 
works), in relation to which the first owner of copyright was the creator, rather than 
the disseminator, of the work.  However, the recognition of the creative input of the 
                                                 
28 Note 17 supra. 
29 [1988] RPC 204. 
30 Note 24 supra. 
director in relation to both copyright ownership and moral rights has muddied this 
water. 
 
The significance of the anomalous copyright treatment of films is unclear.  It seems, 
however, that it may have resulted in one of the more egregious disjunctions between 
copyright and creativity.  One might have hoped that the separation of film from the 
historical accretion listed under the sobriquet “artistic works”, might have freed films 
from the product/process distinction derived from rhetorical aesthetic theory that 
seems to plague the copyright protection of those artistic works.  Not only has this 
proved a false hope, but it also the case that the formal ordering of the legislation, 
under which film is grouped together with entrepreneurial works rather than works of 
primary creativity, seems to have nullified concerns about visual creativity in the 
process of film-making.  These points are illustrated by the case of Norowzian v Arks 
(No 2),31 in which an independent film-maker sued the maker of a Guinness 
advertisement.  In the original film a process of “jump-cutting” had been used in order 
to get a highly distinctive form of movement in the character depicted.  The Guinness 
advertisement produced an identical effect, without the use of jump cutting.  That the 
Guinness advertisement had “copied” the look of the film was not in dispute.  (The 
makers of the Guinness advertisement had requested permission to “copy” the film 
one more than one occasion and that permission had been refused.)  However, the 
court held that the copyright in film could only be infringed by a direct mechanical 
reproduction, hence no infringement.  The result is that a genuinely distinctive, 
innovative and creative use of a visual medium was denied copyright protection.  That 
the process responsible for producing a distinctive visual effect was ignored by the 
court as being outside the realm of copyright concerns is consistent with the usual 
copyright approach to works of visual art.  That visual similarity with the original 
work of visual art counted for nothing is not so consistent, as the discussion below 
demonstrates. 
 
 
 
3. STRIKING THE COPYRIGHT BALANCE 
 
A major theme of copyright law lies in striking the appropriate balance between the 
protection of creativity and the stimulation of further forms of creativity.  This is a 
notoriously difficult task in relation to all types of creativity protected by copyright 
law.  It is nevertheless essential that copyright law recognise that the creative process 
draws upon the influence of earlier works32 with the result that overprotection of 
those works will stifle creativity.  In the context of actions for infringement of 
copyright, the main tools for achieving this balance are said to be the so-called 
idea/expression dichotomy and the fair dealing defences to an action for infringement.  
It is arguable, however, that in relation to artistic works these concepts have failed to 
achieve the necessary balance.  The discussion below posits three related reasons for 
                                                 
31 [2000] FSR 363 (CA). 
32 In relation to the influence of earlier literary works on later literary works, see H Bloom, The Anxiety 
of Influence: A Theory of Poetry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973).  In relation to the influence 
of earlier music on later musical works, see S Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights & Copywrongs: The Rise of 
Intellectual Property & How it Threatens Creativity (New York: New York University Press, 2001),ch 
4.  See generally, F Macmillan Patfield, “Towards a Reconciliation of Free Speech and Copyright” in E 
Barendt (ed), The Yearbook of Media and Entertainment Law 1996 (1996) 199. 
this.  First is the fact that idiosyncratic copyright rules on infringement in relation to 
artistic works unnecessarily lower the threshold for copyright infringement.  
Secondly, particular difficulties have been encountered in applying the 
idea/expression dichotomy in relation to artistic works.  Thirdly, much modern artistic 
practice specifically seeks to challenge either the dominant artistic canon or the 
propertisation of artistic works through copyright law and its neighbouring law of 
oral rights. 
(a) Treating the Dissimilar Similarly II: shape shifting 
gnisably fall 
ithin the copyright definition of artistic works, this rule is problematic. 
m
 
 
 
If the permanence requirement was the only example of the dangers of grouping 
together dissimilar things as though they were essentially similar, the argument that 
this was a matter of concern might ring rather hollow.  It seems, however, that the 
permanence requirement is only one example of a mindset in copyright law that is 
seriously out of kilter with the reality of artistic practice.  Another pertinent example 
of the tendency to treat the dissimilar similarly in relation to artistic works arises in 
relation to the particular rules governing the infringement of copyright in artistic 
works.  In most common law jurisdictions there is a statutory provision to the effect 
that the reproduction of a two dimensional artistic work in three dimensions, or the 
reproduction of a three dimensional work in two dimensions, constitutes an 
infringement of the work.33  This rule only applies to the infringement of artistic 
works so that, for example, the three dimensional reproduction of a literary work 
(such as the knitting of a jumper in accordance with a written knitting pattern) is not 
an infringement.  The exclusivity of this rule immediately raises problems in relation 
to works that seek to challenge the boundaries between artistic works and other types 
of copyright works.34  However, even in the context of works that reco
w
 
This two dimensional/three dimensional rule was, of course, at the heart of the famous 
(or infamous) case of Rogers v Koons,35 in which Jeff Koons was found to have 
infringed copyright when he created a sculpture based upon a well known photo by 
Art Rogers of a couple holding seven puppies.  Koons’ sculpture, “String of Puppies”, 
which was produced for the purpose of his exhibition, “The Banality Show”, was 
anything but a close copy in three dimensions.  In both intention and effect the 
sculpture was a parody of the photograph.  This case is ordinarily seen as raising 
serious issues about the utility of fair dealing/fair use defence,36 upon which some 
comment is made below.  However, it is also worth noting that there would not have 
been an infringement in the first place, but for the two dimensional/three dimensional 
rule.  The visual artist, JSG Boggs, has noted that the result in this case demonstrates 
that copyright law fails to understand that sculpture and photography are quite distinct 
disciplines.  As a result, a sculpture can no more be reasonably regarded as a copy of 
                                                 
33 See, eg, the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 17(3). 
34 This is a persistent trend in modern artistic practice.  Eg, on works that seek to erase the distincti
between art and litera
on 
ture, see A Julius, Transgressions: The Offences of Art (London: Thames & 
 ” in 
 24-25 
Hudson, 2002), 122. 
35 751 F Supp 474 (SDNY 1990), aff’d 960 F 2d 301 (2d Cir), cert denied, 113 S Ct 365 (1992). 
36 See, eg, W Landes, “Copyright, borrowed images and appropriation art: an economic approach
R Towse (ed), Copyright in the Cultural Industries (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002) 9,
a photograph than can a written description of that photograph.37  However, copyright 
law has created a false commonality or similarity between different artistic disciplines 
that allows results that appear meaningless to practitioners of art.  What is more, if 
this is correct, these sorts of results cast serious doubts over the role of the 
ea/expression dichotomy in relation to artistic works. 
) Treating the Dissimilar Similarly III:  idea and expression 
 in question.  Adaptations of literary works, for 
xample, are still literary works. 
ameliorate the excesses of the two dimensional/three dimensional 
fringement rule. 
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Famously, the idea/expression dichotomy provides that copyright protects, not the 
idea underlying the work, but rather its expression.38  As already noted,39 this 
dichotomy is clearly a key concept in rhetorical aesthetic theory, which distinguished 
between the idea and its realisation in the artwork.  The dichotomy is inherently 
problematic, but it has retained a life in copyright law as a useful mechanism for 
balancing the interests of copyright holders and users.  Even if one accepts the 
validity of the distinction as applied in copyright law, how can the notion that 
copyright protects the expression of an idea rather than the idea itself be maintained 
when the two dimensional/three dimensional infringement rule means that copyright 
is protecting a completely dissimilar expression of the idea in question?  That is, 
where it is protecting an expression that is as dissimilar to the copyright work as is a 
written description of the content of a photograph.40  It is, of course, the case that to 
make an adaptation of a literary, dramatic or musical work is to infringe copyright in 
that work,41 but the concept of adaptation does not catch works that are fundamentally 
dissimilar to the copyright work
e
 
It is clear that cases like Rogers v Koons show the two dimensional/three dimensional 
rule in its worst light.  There may be other cases in which the making of a two 
dimensional copy of a three dimensional work (and vice versa) involves the making 
of a close copy and the consequent unjustifiable and non-creative exploitation of 
another’s work.  This suggests that a significant part of the problem here is the failure 
to make the application of the two dimensional/three dimensional infringement rule 
subject to the overriding principle that an infringement only takes place where the 
copier takes the whole or a substantial part42 of the expression, not the idea, of the 
work.  Depressingly, however, a review of the judicial application of the 
idea/expression dichotomy in the context of artistic works does not suggest that it 
would do much to 
in
 
In general, the notion that an idea can be divorced from its expression is not an easy 
one to embrace, except at the most banal level.  The reason for this is that the way an 
idea is expressed is part of the idea itself.43  This is particularly so in relation to a 
 
37 J S G Boggs, “Who Owns This?” (1993) 68 Chicago-Kent Law Review 889, 898-900. 
38 See, eg, Donoghue v Allied Newspapers [1938] Ch 106; Ravenscroft v Herbert [1980] RPC 193; 
Fraser v Thames Television [1983] 2 All ER 101; Green v Broadcasting Corporation [1989] RPC 469 
& 700 (PC). 
39 See text acc n 6 supra. 
40 See text acc n 37 supra. 
41 See, eg, the UK Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, ss 16(1)(e) & 21. 
42 See, eg, UK Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 16(3)(a). 
43 For an elaboration of this argument, see Macmillan Patfield, n 32 supra, 216-219. 
wide range of artistic works and it means that even fatuous examples are difficult.  
We might say that the fact that one person paints a particular scene does not prevent 
someone else also painting it, but we would say it with some caution in the UK after a 
case such as Krisarts v Briarfine.44  In this case, which was an interlocutory 
judgment, the defendants used paintings of certain views in London as one of the 
influences in creating their own paintings of the same scenes.  The defendants’ 
paintings were not particularly similar to the paintings in which the plaintiffs owned 
opyright, nevertheless the court held that an arguable case of copyright infringement 
s that, despite the fact that the defendant’s 
Marguerite” design is not all that visually similar to the plaintiff’s “Ixia” design, an 
tivity.  
                                                
c
existed. 
 
As already noted, consideration of the idea/expression dichotomy in copyright cases is 
closely associated with the question of whether or not the defendant has copied a 
substantial part of the plaintiff’s copyright work.  A UK case that considered this 
matter in relation to artistic works is the House of Lords decision in Designer Guild 
Ltd v Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd.45  This case concerned fabric designs.  The 
plaintiff’s design, “Ixia” was based on a painting by one of its employees.  Said to be 
inspired by the “handwriting and feel” of Matisse, the plaintiff’s painting and 
consequent fabric design was constituted by stripes overlaid by impressionistically 
scattered flowers.  The defendant’s design, “Marguerite” also had stripes and 
impressionistically scattered flowers.  The plaintiff argued that the defendant’s design 
copied a substantial part of its “Ixia” design and, consequently, constituted an indirect 
copying of the original painting of the design.  The Court of Appeal took the view that 
“Marguerite” did not copy a substantial part of the expression of the idea of “Ixia”.  
That is, even though the elements (stripes and flowers) were similar and the means of 
executing the ideas were similar (similar brushwork and resist effect), the overall 
“visual effect” was different.46  The House of Lords unanimously rejected the 
approach of the Court of Appeal and found, like the original trial judge, that an 
infringement had taken place.  All the members of the House of Lords considered the 
question of whether or not substantial taking had occurred.  Lord Hoffman 
specifically considered this in relation to the idea/expression dichotomy.  He took the 
view that different ideas expressed in the copyright work can be abstracted from the 
whole and thus form a substantial part, which if annexed by someone else, will result 
in an infringement.  Thus, the stripes and flowers together form a substantial part of 
the work with the result that when they are used without authorisation an infringement 
occurs.  The end result in this case wa
“
infringement was said to have occurred. 
 
When judges struggle with the meaning of the words and expressions like “artistic” 
and “artistic quality”, when they lay down arbitrary rules about what constitutes a 
painting or an artistic work, when they struggle with the idea/expression dichotomy 
and concepts of substantial taking in relation to artistic works, what they may be 
demonstrating is a particular discomfort with the nature of creativity in the visual arts.  
Where these struggles result in a decision that copyright is infringed by a piece of 
visual art that is visually dissimilar to another work, then copyright law may start to 
have a serious impact on the way in which visual artists exercise their crea
 
44 [1977] FSR 577. 
45 [2000] 1 WLR 2416 (HL). 
46 [2000] FSR 121 (CA), 134 per Morritt LJ. 
Further, such unequal struggles give little confidence in copyright law’s ability to deal 
hallenge the very concepts of copyright law. 
a new work of visual art is well 
exempl
itself, a
involvi
d that the committing of art crimes against art works becomes an 
ion are at the terminal point of an arc that begins with an 
s of “art crimes” involve challenges to a wide range of copyright concepts.  
ome of these challenges are illustrated by a consideration of subversive or 
                                                
with artistic practices that c
 
 
(c) Challenging copyright 
 
The practice47 of appropriation art, based in the discourse of semiotics, in which a 
familiar image is relocated and recontextualised in 
ified by Jeff Koons’ use of Art Rogers’ photograph.  Appropriation art might, 
lso be located within the wider context of subversive or transgressive art, 
ng what Julius has described as “art crimes”: 
Though art crimes are a constant in the history of art-making it is only in the 
modern perio
aesthetic project, and criminal artworks, objects of aesthetic interest.  There 
are two types of these art crimes: offences of reproduction and offences of 
destruction. 
Offences of reproduction are at or near the terminal point of a notional arc that 
begins with an original work, and then travels through pastiche, plagiarism, 
breach of copyright, misattribution of authorship and passing off, to forgery.  
Offences of destruct
original work, and then travels through adaptations, then parody, then breach 
of moral rights, trespass, suppression or other breach of speech rights, to 
criminal damage.48 
Both type
S
transgressive art practices in the context of the law on fair dealing/fair use and moral 
rights.49 
 
Hutcheon has noted that “[r]eappropriating existing representations that are effective 
precisely because they are loaded with pre-existing meaning and putting them into 
new and ironic contexts is a typical form of postmodern … critique”.50  Consistently 
with this approach, in Rogers v Koons, Koons argued that he was entitled to the 
protection of the fair use doctrine on the basis that his work was a parody for the 
purpose of criticizing the banality of popular cultural images.  The US Supreme Court 
held, however, that the fair use defence only applies where the infringing work has 
used a copyright work for the purpose of criticising that copyright work, rather than 
for the purpose of criticising society in general.  This suggests that the fair use 
 
47 It may be argued that this practice has its roots in Dadaism, Surrealism and Pop Art: see B Sherman, 
“Appropriating the Postmodern: Copyright and the Challenge of the New” in D McLean & K Schubert 
(eds), Dear Images: Art, Copyright and Culture (London: Institute of Contemporary Arts & 
Ridinghouse, 2002) 405, 405 citing A Bonnett, “Art, ideology and everyday space: subversive 
tendencies from Dada to postmodernism” (1992) 10 Society and Space 69.  See also, Stokes, n 15 
supra, 125 & 125n. 
48 Julius, n 34 supra, 87. 
49 These are not, of course, the only copyright concepts challenged by postmodern art practices.  
Particular challenges are also made to the concepts of originality and authorship: see K Bowrey, 
“Copyright, the Paternity of Artistic Works and the Challenge Posed by Postmodern Artists” (1994) 8 
Intellectual Property Journal 285.  See also, A Wilson, “‘This is Not by Me.’ Andy Warhol and the 
Question of Authorship” in McClean & Schubert, n 47 supra, 375. 
50 L Hutcheon, The Politics of Postmodernism (London: Routledge, 1989), 44.  This passage is also 
quoted in Stokes, n 15 supra, 125n. 
defence will avail appropriation artists in only a very limited range of cases.  Julius 
has identified transgressive art as falling within three general groups: art that 
questions the meaning or methods of art; art that breaks taboos; and, art that has a 
political motivation.51  If the fair use/fair dealing defence protects only a critique of a 
particular work of art, it seems unlikely that it will offer much protection to 
transgressive forms of appropriation art.  In particular, appropriation art that breaks 
taboos or has a political motivation appears to be outside the protection of the fair 
use/fair dealing defence.  Optimists may argue that subsequent decisions on both sides 
of the Atlantic in cases like Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, Inc52and Time Warner 
Entertainments Company LP v Channel 4 Television Corporation plc53 repair or 
mitigate some of the damage that Rogers v Koons has done to the vitality of the fair 
dealing/fair use defence.  It is true that Time Warner, in particular, would appear to 
permit the use of the fair dealing defence for the purpose of making a wider social 
comment.  However, not only has this mish-mash of case law created confusion about 
e scope of the defence, there is some concern in the UK context that even a more 
 courts will only find a breach of the right of integrity where the 
riginal work is distorted.  If this is correct then this may pose some problems for 
                                                
th
generous application of the fair dealing defence than that allowed in Rogers v Koons 
might be undermined by a robust application of the original artist’s moral rights. 
 
Two aspects of moral rights law are in the frame here.  The first is the copyright 
author’s right of integrity54 and the second is the right against false attribution.55  In 
relation to the right of integrity, the right to object to a distortion of a copyright work 
seems to have a somewhat fatal effect on exactly the type of appropriation for the 
purposes of pastiche or parody that Rogers v Koons suggests would fall within the 
protection of the fair use defence.  That is, an appropriation for the purposes of parody 
or pastiche that has the intention or effect of criticising the copyright work may very 
well be deemed a distortion of the work prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the 
author.  There is some basis for arguing that some parodic appropriations for the 
purpose of making a social comment, rather than commenting on the appropriated 
work, would fare better under moral rights law.  The Swedish case of Svanberg v 
Eriksson56 considered the exhibition of a reproduction of an artistic work to which 
printed comments and printing instructions had been added for the purposes of 
making a comment on the commercial exploitation of graphic art.  This was not 
regarded as a breach of the original artist’s right of integrity as there was no material 
alteration to the central elements of the work.57  On the other hand, one might have 
thought that the sort of distortion involved in a case like Rogers v Koons would raise 
an arguable case of a breach of the right of integrity.  It is interesting to note, 
however, that the distortions in both Svanberg v Eriksson and Rogers v Koons were 
not to the original artwork.58  There are some grounds, examined below, for 
supposing that the
o
 
51 Julius, n  supra, ch III. 
52 114 S Ct 1164 (1994).  For a fuller discussion of this case in the context of the relationship between 
copyright & free speech, see Macmillan Patfield, n 32 supra, 226-230. 
53 [1994] EMLR 1.  For a fuller discussion of this case in the context of the relationship between 
copyright & free speech, see Macmillan Patfield, n 32 supra, 226-230. 
54 UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 80. 
55 UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 84. 
56 [1979] European Intellectual Property Review D-93. 
57 See further Stokes, n 15 supra, 137. 
58 Whatever that might be considered to be in the case of a photograph. 
some types of transgressive art, but would seem to leave appropriation art largely 
unscathed by the right of integrity. 
 
So far as breaches of moral rights in relation to appropriation art are concerned, it 
only remains to note that the recontextualisation of the appropriated image might raise 
e possibility of a breach of the right against false attribution.  It seems likely, 
owever, that this right will only be infringed where the paternity of the appropriation 
ng.   As Teilmann has noted, Kant is 
lso making the point that some types of artistic works are not susceptible to the 
th
h
artist is not clear.59 
 
 
4. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ORIGINAL 
 
The materiality of visual art echoes through much of the above discussion.  The 
apparently philistine epigram of Lawton LJ in the Adam Ant case that a painting “is 
not an idea: it is an object”60 may have been (subconsciously) influenced by the 
materiality issue.  Perhaps Lawton LJ meant what Teilmann has said much more 
elegantly: “Visual art is not separable from its materiality, from the physical entity of 
the painting, or the drawing, or the sculpture.  Texts on the contrary are 
characteristically immaterial”.61  Similarly, when Boggs expresses incredulity at the 
idea that a sculpture can constitute a copy of a photograph,62 perhaps he is partly 
getting at the same sort of thing as Kant who suggests that to make, for example, an 
engraving of a painting is not to make a copy of it because the painting is a unique 
object, which cannot be copied by an engravi 63
a
dangers of copying in the same ways that others are because the original will always 
be more valued and valuable than any copy.64 
 
The materiality of some types of visual arts contrasts, especially these days, with 
literary works, which are immaterial.65  The first manuscript is a step in the process of 
the expression of the idea to the public rather than an end in itself.  In terms of the 
expression of the literary work, one copy of a book is as good as another.  On the 
other hand, a painting or sculpture, for example, cannot be separated from its own 
materiality and is, therefore, an end in itself rather than merely a means to an end.66  
Of course, there are a number of types of artistic works protected by copyright law 
that lack the characteristic of materiality.  This would be true, for example, many of 
the forms of artistic works falling within the definition of “graphic works”.67  It is true 
of many photographs.  It is also true of some things categorised by copyright law as 
                                                 
59 See Clark v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1998] 1 All ER 959.  See further, M Blakeney & F 
y and Moral Rights under Australian Copyright Law” (1998) 3 Media & 
uthorship of Images”, Paper presented at the Crossroads in 
ra, citing I Kant, “Von der Unrechtmäßigkeit der Büchernachdrucks”, 
he Monatsschrift 5 (May 1785), 403-417. 
ann, n 61 supra. 
(2). 
Macmillan, “Journalistic Parod
Arts Law Review 124. 
60 See n 27 supra, & acc text. 
61 S Teilmann, “Framing the Law: A
Cultural Studies Conference, Tampere, Finland, June 2002 
62 See n 37 supra, and & acc text. 
63 See Teilmann, n 61 sup
Berlinisc
64 Teilm
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 See, eg, UK Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 4
sculptures.68  This distinction between material and immaterial works seems to go to 
the heart of copyright law, which is after all, just like the system of Venetian printing 
privileges, a right to prevent copying.  The meaningfulness and operation of such a 
right must surely be qualitatively different for material and immaterial works.69  If 
this is so then for copyright law to be relevant to artistic practice the protection that 
artists need from both copyright law and its neighbouring moral rights law may be 
ifferent depending upon whether or not they are creating works intended to be 
de suite in Anglo-American copyright 
stems may owe something to the fact that, inconsistently with the usual tenor of 
                                                
d
unique one-off pieces or whether they are creating works that are purely for the 
purposes of reproduction. 
 
It might be argued that as a right against copying, copyright is irrelevant to works of 
visual art in which the value resides in the original one off work.  On the other hand, it 
is also arguable that the creators of such works are entitled to protection from 
unauthorised commercialisation of such works in the form of, for example, 
photographs.  At the least copyright law needs to find a mechanism for treating the 
copyright owners of unique one-off pieces like other copyright owners by giving them 
a financial stake in the work based on the demand for the work in the marketplace.  
For other copyright owners that demand will be reflected in the demand for 
reproductions.  For the copyright owner of the unique one off artistic work, the 
demand for such work in the market place is largely reflected in the price put on the 
one-off item.70  This might be reflected in the introduction of a resale right for the 
copyright holder.  To be consistent with the general tenor of copyright law this 
economic right should belong to the copyright holder, not to the artist-author, in order 
to put the copyright holder of a one-off artistic work in an economic position that 
reflects the economic position of other copyright holders.  The artist will, of course, 
be the beneficiary of this, provided he or she retains copyright in their work.  The 
economic loss suffered by the artist who transfers his or her copyright along with the 
physical ownership of the item is, in many ways, no different to any other author of a 
copyright work who transfers away their copyright only to find that the work 
subsequently becomes much more valuable.  It is interesting that the droit de suite, 
which exists in most EU countries, confers a resale right on the artist not the copyright 
holder.  This is not surprising given the (obvious) origins of the droit de suite in a 
droit d’auteur system.71  Resistance to the droit 
sy
copyright law in such systems, it benefits the author rather than the copyright owner 
with increases in the market value of the work. 
 
So far as the moral rights of the author of a one-off work are concerned, as suggested 
above, there is some basis upon which to suspect that judges implicitly take into 
account the distinction between works that are intended to be an end in themselves 
 
ope 
ed as non-rivalrous and non-crowdable: see, eg, J Waldron, “From Authors to Copiers: 
 
and for reproductions of 
es between the droit d’auteur system and the Anglo-American conception of 
y J A L Sterling, World Copyright Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003). 
68 See, eg, Wham-O Manufacturing Co v Lincoln Industries Ltd [1985] RPC 127; & Breville Eur
plc v Thorn EMI Domestic Appliances Ltd [1995] FSR 77. 
69 In fact, the very idea presents a challenge to notions of intellectual property, which is usually 
characteris
Individual Rights & Social Values in Intellectual Property” (1993) 69 Chicago-Kent Law Review 841,
870-874. 
70 If a painting or sculpture becomes particularly famous there may be a dem
the painting on postcards, in books and so on.  However, such the return on such demand will 
ordinarily be a poor reflection of the increase in value of the original item. 
71 On the differenc
copyright, see generall
and works that are intended or designed to be exactly reproducible.  In making this 
argument, Teilmann72 cites the UK cases of Tidy v Trustees of the Natural History 
Museum73 and Pasterfield v Denham74 concerning the moral right of integrity.75  In 
both of these cases the distortions to which the artists objected were to reproductions 
of the work, rather than the originals.  The courts declined to follow the Canadian 
case of Snow v The Eaton Centre Ltd,76 in which the distortion occurred to the 
original work.  Teilmann suggests “cautiously” that there may be significance in the 
fact that English cases concerned treatment of the reproductions while the Canadian 
case concerned the original and unique work.  This suggestion is also consistent with 
the outcome, if not the dicta, of Svanberg v Eriksson.77  If the suggestion is correct, 
then it may be that this distinction between works that are an end in themselves and 
other copyright works is being recognised in a way that prejudices the artists of one-
ff works.  On the other hand, it may also be responsible for ensuring that the right of 
ch an order of conscious transgression that any 
hibition provided by a moral right against destruction of an original art work would 
be likely to be balanced by the stimulating effect of transgressing not only artistic 
convention, but also moral rights law. 
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integrity in relation to artistic works does not undermine possible gains for artistic 
practice arising from the fair dealing/fair use defence.78 
 
It seems rather unsatisfactory that the possible clash between the fair dealing/fair use 
rights and the right of integrity of authors can be solved in the case of one off artistic 
works, but not other copyright works, by taking away the moral right of the artist to 
exercise any control over the treatment of copies of the work.79  In general, a more 
coherent resolution of the tension between the concepts of fair dealing and the right of 
integrity is necessary.  More specifically, the law of copyright and neighbouring rights 
needs to give attention to the question of the applicability of its general concepts to 
works that are unique one off pieces, copies of which will always be qualitatively 
different from the original.  If the logical conclusion of such a consideration is to deny 
to the authors of such works the protection of the right of integrity in relation to 
copies, then the corollary of this must be that such authors of such works are entitled 
to a moral right to prevent the destruction of the unique original physical object in 
which their creativity is embedded.80  It is not impossible that the right of integrity in 
fact gives this protection, but it not clear.  Giving such protection will, of course, 
impact upon the type of transgressive art that involves the destruction of original art 
works.81  However, such work is of su
in
 
72 Note 61 supra. 
73 [1998] 39 IPR 501. 
74 [1999] 26 FSR 168. 
75 See the UK Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 80. 
76 70 CPR (2d) 105 (1982), in which it was held that a breach of the author’s right of integrity occurred 
when a shopping centre altered the appearance of a sculpture depicting Canadian geese in their 
migratory pattern by tying putatively festive red and green ribbons around the necks of the geese. 
77 See nn 56-58 supra, & acc text.  The Supreme Court of Sweden appeared to accept that a breach of 
the right of integrity might have occurred as a result of a distortion of a copy of the work. 
78 See text acc nn 54-58 supra. 
79 At least in the case of some types of artistic work, it also seems inconsistent with the provisions of, 
eg, the UK Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 80(4). 
80 See also Teilmann, n 61 supra, who cites as an example of such an approach the right to “protection 
against destruction” in Article 15(1) of the Swiss Federal Law on Copyright of 9 October 1992, as 
amended. 
81 See, eg, Julius, n 34 supra, 87, & text acc n 48 supra. 
